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THE REQUIREMENT OF A "HIT" FOR COVERAGE
AGAINST HIT-AND-RUN DRIVERS UNDER
UNINSURED MOTORISTS STATUTES AND
POLICY ENDORSEMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The ever expanding use of the automobile brought about
the need for the use of state police power to set and enforce
standards of reasonable road conduct. The slaughter that still
takes place daily on the nation's highways demonstrated the
need for some mode of compensating the innocent victims of
this brutal tragedy, because far too often the tortfeasor was
not able to respond financially for the damages he caused. Fi-
nancial responsibility laws were the first major attempt to-
ward a partial solution of this problem, the first being enacted
by Connecticut in 1925.1 All fifty states have now adopted
some form of legislation directed toward the financial respon-
sibility of motorists.2
These laws provide a system for proof of financial respon-
sibility after an accident has occurred as a condition prece-
dent to allowing the driver at fault to continue the privilege
of driving. Such proof usually takes the form of liability in-
surance coverage for any future accidents. However, the one
weakness in most of this type of legislation is that it looks only
toward insuring financial responsibility for the second acci-
dent (and thus at least partial recompense for the second vic-
tim), this being reminiscent of the old common law rule al-
lowing a dog one "free bite." Some states strengthened their
financial responsibility laws in this respect by withholding
the driving privilege, even after proof of future financial
responsibility, until the driver had either provided proof that
the claim of the original victim had been settled or the
judgement satisfied or that the case was tried resulting in a
verdict for the defendant.
1. Law of January 1, 1926, ch. 183 (1925), Conn. Public Acts 3958
(repealed 1927).
2. For a listing of these statutes see Ward, New York's Motor Vehicle
Accident Indemnification Corporation: Past, Present, and Future, 8 BuF-
FALO L. Rnv. 215, 218 n.8 (1959). The one state not listed in the above
article, Alaska, has since enacted such a law. ALAsx STAT. § 28.20.010-
.640 (Supp. 1962).
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While such financial responsibility legislation did further
the cause of the "first-bite" victim, it still did not provide
the protection desired. Massachusetts,3 New York,4 and North
Carolina5 enacted compulsory insurance programs in an effort
to relieve this shortcoming of financial responsibility laws.
However, while these compulsory insurance plans protected
the first victim when the accident involved a resident wrong-
doer, there still remained loopholes in cases involving non-
resident drivers and hit-and-run drivers and in those situa-
tions in which the insurance company disclaimed liability for
want of co-operation or absence of permission to drive.
Several other states took a different approach toward pro-
tecting the first-accident victim by enacting unsatisfied claim
and judgement funds under state control.6 These statutes allow
a resident, injured in the state by a financially irresponsible
motorist, to recover limited compensation. These programs
are so limited in scope and amount of award that they do not
satisfactorily compensate the victim of the "first bite."
The insurance industry, fearful of the spread of compulsory
insurance and attendant state regulation of coverage and rates,
and because of its dislike of unsatisfied claim and judgment
funds, created the uninsured motorist endorsement. 7 Under
3. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34 A-J (1957), as amended, (Supp.
1966); id. ch. 175, § 113 A-G (1959), as amended, (Supp. 1966).
4. Law of April 16, 1956, ch. 655, 393, (1956), McKinny's Session Laws
of New York 758 (repealed 1959).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 to -319 (1965).
6. MD. ANN. CODE, art. 66%, § 150-79 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
39:6-61 to -91 (1961), as amended, (Supp. 1966); N.D. CENT. CODE §
39-17-01 to -10 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1967). See generally Loiseaux,
Innocent Victims 1959, 39 TExAS L. REv. 154 (1959); Plummer, The Un-
compensated Automobile Accident Victims, 24 INS. COUNSEL J. 78 (1957);
Ward, The Uninsured Motorist: National and International Protection
Presently Available and Comparative Problems in Substantial Similarity,
9 BUFFALO L. REv. 283 (1960).
7. See generally 7 J. APPLEluAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4331
(1962) ; Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1252 (1961) ; Chadwick & Poch6, California's
Insured Motorist Statute: Scope and Problems, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 194
(1961); Court, Virginia's Experience with the Uninsured Motorist Act, 3
WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 237 (1962); Doar & Richardson, The South Carolina
Uninsured Motorist Law, 15 S.C.L. RLv. 739 (1963); Donaldson, Uninsured
Motorist Coverage, 34 INS. COUNSEL J. 57 (1967); Notman, A Decennial
Study of Uninsured Motorist Endorsements, 1968 INS. L.J. 22; Patterson,
The South Carolina Uninsured Motorist Act, 13 S.C.L.Q. 528 (1961) ; Ward,
New York's Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation: Past,
Present and Future, 8 BUFFALO L. REV. 215 (1959) ; Widiss, Perspective on
Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 62 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 497 (1967); Note, MVAJC
Six Years Later-A Practical Appraisal 39 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 321 (1965);
Note, Uninsured Coverage in Florida, 14 U. FLA. L. REV. 455 (1962); Note,
Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Virginia, 47 VA. L. REv. 145 (1961) ; Com-
ment, The Uninsured Motorist Endorsement--Soms Problems of Construc-
tion, 42 TuL. L. REv. 352 (1968).
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this endorsement the insured can recover from his own in-
surer damages he was legally entitled to recover from an
uninsured motorist. New Hampshire was the first state to
enact a statute requiring that this endorsement be included
in all policies issued or delivered in that state.8 Virginia
followed in 1958,0 California in 1959,10 and today a sub-
stantial number of states have legislation requiring insurance
companies to make such coverage available.1 In most states
the insured has the right to reject such coverage, but nine
states make the coverage mandatory.1 2
II. THE CONTACT REQUIREMENT IN HIT-AND-RUN
SITUATIONS
With wide acceptance of the uninsured motorist coverage
as at least a partial answer to the problem of protecting
motorists from irresponsible tortfeasors, there have arisen
numerous areas leading to litigation. One such area involves
the hit-and-run driver who is considered to be an uninsured
motorist because his victim is in as much need of compensa-
tion as is the victim of the wrongdoer who is known but
uninsured. More specifically, the area of conflict involves the
requirement set out in some state statutes that there be phy-
sical contact between a hit-and-run vehicle and the injured
party (the insured) who is seeking to recover from his own
insurance carrier. The Standard Policy endorsement,' 3 which
is the most frequently encountered expression of this require-
ment, defines a hit-and-run automobile as follows:
"Hit-and-run automobile" means an automobile
which causes bodily injury to an insured arising out
8. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 268.15 (Supp. 1966).
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 (Supp. 1968).
10. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West Supp. 1967).
11. Those states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin. See Widiss, Prospective on Uninsured Motorist Cov-
erage, 62 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 497 n. 10 (1967). South Carolina's Uninsured
Motorist Statute was passed in 1959 as an amendment to the Motor Vehicle
Safety Responsibility Act. It was extensively amended to its present form
in 1963.
12. Those states are: Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, New Hampshire, New
York, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia.
13. National Bureau of Casualty Underwriter Family Protection Cov-
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of physical contact of such automobile with the in-
sured or with an automobile which is insured at
the time of the accident provided:
(a) there cannot be ascertained the identity of
either the operator or the owner of such "hit-and-
run automobile;"
(b) the insured or someone on his behalf shall
have reported the accident within 24 hours to a
police, peace, or judicial officer or to the Commis-
sioner of Motor Vehicles, and shall have filed with
the company within 30 days thereafter a statement
under oath that the insured or his legal represent-
ative has a cause or causes of action arising out of
such accident for damages against a person or
persons whose identity is unascertainable, and set-
ting forth the facts in support thereof, and
(c) at the company's request, the insured or legal
representative makes available for inspection the
automobile which the insured was occupying at the
time of the accident.
14
Exactly what degree of contact is necessary to satisfy the
policy requirements will be discussed later, but the general
rule is that there must be either direct or indirect contact
between the hit-and-run automobile and the insured or the
car in which the insured is riding in order for the insured
to recover on his uninsured motorist endorsement.
As controversies emerged under these policy endorsements
and statutes, some states recognized a need for clarification
and amplification in their uninsured motorist statutes and
responded by amending or drafting their statutes to specify
contact as a prerequisite to recovery from one's insurer for
the misconduct of a hit-and-run driver.15 A typical expres-
sion of this contact requirement is found in the South Caro-
lina statute which provides:
If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which
causes bodily injury or property damage to the in-
sured be unknown, there shall be no right of action
14. Id. (emphasis added).
15. E.g., CAL. INS. CODe § 1180.2 (West Supp. 1967); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 56-407.1(b) (Supp. 1967); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8285-52 (Supp. 1966);
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or recovery under the uninsured motorist provision,
unless
(1) the insured or someone in his behalf shall have
reported the accident to some appropriate police
authority within a reasonable time, under all the
circumstances, after its occurrence and unless
(2) the injury or damage was caused by physical
contact with the unknown vehicle and
(3) the insured was not negligent in failing to de-
termine the identity of the other vehicle and the
driver of the other vehicle at the time of the ac-
cident.16
It is apparent that the statute has done no more than set
out the basic requirements of the standard form endorsement.
These statutory provisions did, however, make it clear that
the requirement of contact was valid and considered neces-
sary. The intended purpose of requiring a showing of con-
tact between the hit-and-run vehicle and the insured was to
lessen the possibility of spurious claims. The contact re-
quirement is supposed to eliminate the claims of the driver
who, through his own negligence, causes injury to himself
without the involvement of another vehicle and then seeks
to recover on the ground that the accident was caused by a
hit-and-run driver' 7-for example, when a driver falls asleep
at the wheel, leaves the road, hits a pole, and claims he had
to swerve off the road to avoid being struck by an unidenti-
fied driver. In discussing the purpose of the contact require-
ment, the leading case of Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnifi-
cation Corp. v. Eisenberg's states:
The assertion of a hit and run accident is a proposi-
tion easy to allege and difficult to disprove. Absent
protective legislation, it opens the door to abuses in-
cluding fraud and collusion .... The problem, how-
ever, virtually disappears with the requirement of
"physical contact." Proof that a hit and run vehicle
did in fact exist is then clearly available for, as "phy-
sical contact" almost invariably produces visible evi-
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.34 (Supp. 1967) (emphasis added).
17. See, e.g State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Spinola, 374 F.2d 873
(5th Cir. 1967 ; Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Lopez, 238 Cal. App. 2d 441,
47 Cal. Rptr. 834, 835 (1965) ; Comment, The Uninsured Motorist Endorse-
ment-Some Problems of Construction, 42 TuL. L. RFv. 352, 364 (1968).
18. 18 N.Y.2d 1, 218 N.E.2d 524, 271 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1966).
[Vol. 20
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dence of impact, the possibility of a "phantom" hit
and run driver becomes minimal. 19
As the Eisenberg court pointed out, the contact requirement
stems from a valid concern that without such a prerequisite
to coverage, fraud and collusion may be practiced against the
insurer. However, not all states have deemed it necessary
to impose or permit such a requirement. Virginia's uninsured
motorist statute does not require any contact or collision with
an unknown driver.20 This is, however, the minority position
since most states either require contact by statute or permit
the policy endorsement to make it a condition precedent to
coverage as a matter of contract.
III. WHAT IS "PHYSICAL CONTACT?"
Having established the general rule that contact is required,
the crux of the inquiry then becomes the construction that
courts have given the words "physical contact." This can
best be examined by use of several hypotheticals illustrative
of factual situations in which questions arise as to whether
the requirement of physical contact has been satisfied. At
one end of the spectrum there is the clear-cut no-contact
situation in which car B is forced off the road by car X
which fails to stop, damage ensuing to car B or its occu-
pants. Here, clearly, car B could not collect under its unin-
sured motorist coverage. 21 At the other end of the spectrum
there is the direct contact situation, in which car B is struck
and forced off the road by an unknown car X, damage again
being caused to car B or its occupants. Once again the result
is clear: car B and its occupants may collect under the unin-
sured motorist endorsement because the necessary physical
19. Id. at 3, 218 N.E.2d at 526, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 643 (1966). See also
Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Lopez, 238 Cal. App. 2d 441, 47 Cal. Rptr.
834 (1965); Coker v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 161 S.E.2d 175 (S.C. 1968);
Note, Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Florida, 14 U. FLA. L. RaV. 455,
459 (1962); Comment, The Uninsured Motorist Endorsement-Some Prob-
lems of Construction, 42 TuL. L. REv. 352, 364 (1968).
20. See Doe v. Simmers, 207 Va. 956, 154 S.E.2d 146 (1967) ; Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sours, 205 Va. 602, 139 S.E.2d 51 (1964) ; Doe v. Faulkner,
203 Va. 522, 125 S.E.2d 169 (1962) ; Doe v. Brown, 203 Va. 508, 125 S.E.2d
159 (1962); Court, Virginia Experience With the Uninsured Motorist Act,
3 Wm. & MARY L. RaV. 237 (1962); Note, Uninsured Motorist Coverage in
Virginia, 47 VA. L. R!y. 145, 164 (1961).
21. See, e.g., Cruger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1964) ;
Prosk v. Allstate Ins. Co., 82 IMI. App. 2d 457, 226 N.E.2d 498 (1967) ;
Roloff v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 191 So. 2d 901 (La. 1966). However, the
result would differ in Virginia where contact is not required. See Note 20,
supra and accompanying text.
NOTES1968]
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contact was present.22 In between these two extremes lie the
areas which give rise to an increasing amount of litigation.
A situation being litigated with increasing frequency is
that involving a third party in addition to the insured and
the unidentified motorist. This is best illustrated by the
leading case of Inter-Insurance Exchange -. Lopez. 23 In Lo-
pez car X crossed the center line and hit car B, propelling it
into contact with car C, the insured. Car X fled the scene
of the accident and his identity remained unknown. The court
had before it the sole issue of whether there was physical
contact between car X and car C so as to bring the accident
within the coverage of the policy. The insurer resisted on the
grounds that there had been no physical touching between
the hit-and-run vehicle and the insured automobile. In de-
termining whether a literal touching was required, the court
found satisfaction in the analogy of the common-law concept
of battery and the related action of trespass on the case.24
Common-law battery involved a willful and direct touching
of the person of another, including any forcible contact
brought about by an object or thing set in motion by the
defendant. Indirect contacts-that is, those not satisfying
the above described directness-were classified merely as
actionable wrongs rather than batteries and gave rise to an
action for trespass on the case rather than an action of
trespass vi et armis. The Lopez court stated its conclusions
as follows:
We think when the legislature established the re-
quirement of physical contact in the present law, it
intended to make a distinction between a direct and
an indirect application of force similar to that which
the common law had earlier found useful in distin-
guishing between trespass and case. In our view
a direct application of force, as by Car X striking
Car B and forcing it to hit Car C, qualifies as physi-
cal contact within the meaning of the statute.2 5
The New York case of Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnifi-
cation Corp. v. Eisenberg,26 decided shortly after Lopez, in-
22. E.g., Basore v. Allstate Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 626 (Mo. 1963).
23. 238 Cal. App. 2d 441, 47 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1965).
24. See generally W. Prosser, HtANIBoK OF THE LAw or TORTS 28-29
(3d ed. 1964).
25. 238 Cal. App. 2d at 443-44, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 836-37.
26. 18 N.Y.2d 1, 218 N.E.2d 524, 271 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1966).
[Vol. 20
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volved a similar factual situation. Car C was struck by car B
which had been struck and pushed across the center-divider
by car X, a hit-and-run vehicle. The court held that the New
York Legislature did not intend to impose the burden of
requiring direct physical contact without the intervention of
another automobile. It held that under the circumstances,
the physical contact sustained was sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the New York Insurance Law.27 The court
reasoned that while the physical contact requirement was
intended to prevent fraud and collusion, the policy of the
entire statute was to compensate the innocent victim of a
negligent uninsured motorist and this policy should be fur-
thered rather than defeated whenever possible. The court
concluded that since contact did take place indirectly, by
way of an intervening automobile, the possibility of fraud
had diminished. By construing the physical contact require-
ment of the statute as being satisfied by less than physical
contact, the underlying policy of compensation to the innocent
victim was furthered.
In Johnson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.28 an unknown hit-and-run vehicle struck car B causing
it to strike car C (the insured vehicle). The court, following
the view of Lopez, held that there was "physical contact" be-
tween the unknown vehicle and the insured vehicle within
the meaning of the standard policy clause defining hit-and-
run automobiles and requiring physical contact.
29
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
followed Lopez and Eisenberg in the recent Florida case of
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Spinola.80
Here, as in those two cases, the insured's vehicle was struck
by a vehicle which had been knocked into it by an unknown
hit-and-run motorist.
One argument advanced by some claimants, but thus far
rejected by the courts, is that if the hit-and-run vehicle was
the proximate cause of the injury to the insured, this would
satisfy the contact requirement of the statute or policy. In
the Lopez case, in which the hit-and-run vehicle struck a
second car, forcing it into the insured, the claimant advanced
27. N.Y. INS. CODE ANN. § 617 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
28. 70 Wash.2d, 424 P.2d 648 (1967).
29. See notes 13 & 14 supra & accompanying text.
30. 374 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1967).
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the proximate cause argument. He contended that since the
hit-and-run vehicle set in motion the sequence of events ending
in contact with the insured, proof of proximate causation
should satisfy the contact requirement. While the claimant
in Lopez did recover, it was on the ground that there was
indirect contact and not on the basis of proximate causation.
Indeed, the court expressly rejected the proximate cause argu-
ment, pointing out that to follow such reasoning would largely
write out of the statute the contact requirement and reopen
the door to the abuses it was intended to prevent. The court
illustrated the inappropriateness of applying the proximate
cause rationale with the following example: If car X swerved
in front of car B, causing it to swerve and strike car C, the
act of car X would have been the proximate cause of the
accident without the slightest touching of car B or car C by
car X. The court concluded by stating that "the question of
proximate cause is largely irrelevant to the determination
whether or not physical contact occurred.
'3 1
The proximate cause argument was again advanced in the
recent California case of Page v. Insurance Co. of North
America. 2 The hypothetical used by the court in Lopez ac-
tually occurred in Page; that is, car X crossed the center line
of the highway, causing car B to swerve to avoid collision
which resulted in car B striking car C (the insured). There
was no contact between car X and either car B or car C, but
clearly car X had proximately caused the collision. Relying
on the arguments in Lopez, the court rejected the idea that
the proximate cause rationale might serve as a substitute for
physical contact and denied recovery under the uninsured mo-
torist provisions.
In the recent South Carolina case of Coker v. Nationwide
Insurance Co.3 3 one of the grounds for recovery relied on by
the plaintiff and sustained by the lower court was that the
acts of the unknown driver caused car B to strike car C (the
plaintiff). In Coker car X and car B were racing, car X
occupying the proper lane and car B ultimately occupying the
lane intended for traffic proceeding in the opposite direction.
Car C was proceeding in the proper lane, meeting the racers
when car B collided head-on with car C and car X continued
31. Inter-Insurance Exchange v. Lopez, 238 Cal. App. 2d 441, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 834, 836 (1965).
32. 256 Cal. App. 2d 408, 64 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Ct. App. 1967).
33. 161 S.E.2d 175 (S.C. 1968).
798 [Vol. 20
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NOTES
on unidentified. The court stated that the statute34 neither
specifies nor implies that the contact requirement may be
met by proof that the unknown vehicle caused the accident.
The court made it clear that neither a showing nor even an
admission that the hit-and-run vehicle was the proximate
cause of the accident would serve as a substitute for a show-
ing of physical contact.
It should be noted that in Goker there was no contact be-
tween car X and car B and the court reserved the question of
whether the contact requirement would have been satisfied
if contact between the hit-and-run and the intervening vehicle
were present. It would seem likely that the South Carolina
Supreme Court would follow the weight of authority repre-
sented by the Lopez and Eisenberg decisions, especially in
view of the similarity of the state statutory requirements of
physical contact. The reasoning and logic of these decisions
are unassailable and the equity of the situation would com-
mand such a result. Considering the purpose of the safety
responsibility legislation as a whole, as well as the purpose
of the requirement for physical contact, the result reached
in Lopez and Eisenberg is desirable.
Before leaving the Coker decision another argument of the
plaintiff deserves consideration. The plaintiff resourcefully
contended that since the unknown vehicle and the vehicle with
which the plaintiff collided were racing and thereby jointly
liable for the consequences of their unlawful acts,85 it was
just as if the unknown driver was driving the car of his
racing companion which actually did come in physical contact
with the insured. Thus, the plaintiff asserted, in effect, that
the unknown driver came into constructive contact with the
insured in that he was responsible for the conduct of the
vehicle which did in fact make contact. While this argument
appeals to one's sense of justice, it is submitted that to allow
the contact requirements to be circumvented by such a strained
construction would be amending the statute rather than con-
struing it to give effect to its plain meaning. The court,
feeling that such an interpretation would do violence to the
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.34 (Supp. 1967).
35. Racing motor vehicles on the public highway is negligence and un-
lawful under S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-356 (1962), and all who engage in the
race do so at their peril and are liable for injury sustained by third persons
as a result thereof. This is true even though only one of the vehicles en-
gaged in the race actually inflicts the injury. Skipper v. Hartley, 242 S.C.
221, 130 S.E.2d 486 (1963).
1968]
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language of the statute, rejected the plaintiff's arguments and
reversed the lower court. The court concluded by stating
that
[t]he statute makes proof of physical contact a con-
dition precedent in every case for the recovery of
damages caused by an unknown driver and vehicle.
There are no exceptions. If it is advisable that the
statute be changed, the solution lies within the prov-
ince of the Legislature. We have no right to legislate
the provisions from the statute or to modify its
application under the guise of judicial interpreta-
tion.80
IV. ALTERNATIVES To THE CONTACT REQUIREMENT
With the exception of the concession allowing indirect phy-
sical contact to suffice in some situations, courts have gen-
erally withstood attempts to erode or do away with the statu-
tory or contractual requirement of physical contact in order
for one to recover under uninsured motorist coverage in
hit-and-run situations. One cannot dispute the purpose for
which the physical contact requirement was instituted. The
physical contact provision of the statute "was undoubtedly
adopted to curb fraud, collusion and other abuses arising
from the assertion of claims that phantom vehicles had caused
accidents."8' 7 It is an easy matter to allege than an unknown
vehicle caused an accident but it is almost impossible to dis-
prove such allegations. The imposition of the contact re-
quirement, however, leaves unprotected those who are actually
forced off of the road by the unknown driver. It is reflexive
for a driver to jerk the steering wheel to avoid collision when
a passing motorist cuts back in too quickly or when an ap-
proaching car is straddling the center line. This jerk of the
wheel often avoids collision with the negligent motorist, but
it can easily result in loss of control and severe damage. Yet
the law, in effect, requires the motorist to follow his natural
reflexes at his peril-that is, by taking the chance that either
he will not be injured in avoiding contact or that if he is
injured the negligent driver will stop to accept his liability.
Put another way, the statute or policy endorsement is saying
to the insured that he had better at least "get in a lick" if
36. 161 S.E.2d at 178.
37. Id. at 177. See also notes 17 & 18 supra and accompanying text.
(Vol. 20
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NOTES
he is to be assured that someone will respond in damages
for any injuries that follow.
The potential absurdity of the physical contact requirement
as a fraud-preventing measure may be seen in the following
example: X, an uninsured motorist driving a stolen car while
intoxicated swerves across the center line of a highway and
B, traveling in the opposite direction, swerves to avoid a
head-on collision with X. B's car leaves the road and over-
turns, causing severe injury to B and his passenger. Thirty
honorable bishops observe the entire accident but none of
them recall the license number of X's car. Because there was
no contact with the hit-and-run vehicle, neither B nor his
passenger may recover under the uninsured motorist clause.88
Another slightly exaggerated hypothetical situation illus-
trates the potentially harsh and unrealistic result that could
flow from the requirement of physical contact: A pedestrian
(insured) observes an automobile out of control and coming
up over the curb in his direction. In dashing to get out of
the way, the pedestrian crashes through a plate glass window
as the only means of escape from the errant automobile
which leaves the scene and remains unknown. As his "re-
ward" for the avoidance of collision with the automobile, the
insured incurs severe wounds, the most painful being the
denial of recovery under his uninsured motorist coverage.30
The above two examples serve simply to illustrate the
situations in which bona fide, grevious injuries can be in-
curred as a result of the negligence of the unknown vehicle
but without physical contact. Notwithstanding the unimpeach-
able testimony of the thirty honorable bishops in the first
example, recovery is denied the injured insured because the
technical requirement of contact is absent. Despite the avail-
ability of numerous reliable and disinterested witnesses, the
insured pedestrian of the second example may not rely upon
his uninsured motorist coverage to compensate him for the
injuries caused by the hit-and-run automobile which did not
actually come in contact with its victim.
Once the absurdity of these situations is acknowledged the
problem then becomes one of finding some way to accomplish
38. The illustration paraphrases one from Chadwick & Poch6, California
Uninsured Motorist Statute: Scope and Problems, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 194,
198 (1961).
39. The illustration paraphrases one from Notman, A Decennial Study of
Uninsured Motorist Endorsements, 1968 INs. L.J. 22, 28.
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the prevention of fraud while at the same time allowing
coverage to those bona fide no-contact cases of "hit-and-run."
One possible solution is to provide some alternative to impact
such as the sworn statements of disinterested witnesses.
While this would not reach the no-contact accident that oc-
curred unwitnessed on a deserted road, it would at least
reduce the number of instances where the absence of physical
contact actually works a forfeiture of coverage when coverage
should be afforded. To this suggestion would surely come the
reply that this would only give the insured a means of
perpetrating a fraud by going out and finding himself some
"witnesses" when in reality there were no witnesses to the
accident and no "hit-and-run" vehicle. While this is a pos-
sibility, it would appear not to be any more serious in this
situation than it is in any other situation in which the testi-
mony of witnesses is used to supply the needed proof. Notice,
too, that the suggestion is that disinterested witnesses supply
the needed evidence of the unknown vehicle's causal role.
This means that someone other than the insured 0 or one
interested in the outcome of the litigation would be required
to offer the necessary testimony corroborating that of the
claimant.
Another suggestion advanced is the requirement that in the
absence of physical contact, the plaintiff must prove his claim
by clear, cogent and convincing evidence rather than by
the greater weight or preponderance of evidence. There
is some authority supporting the requirement that the plain-
tiff in an action easily open to fraud or deception must
prove his claim by this higher standard of persuasion.41 There
is no apparent reason why such a standard could not be used
in "John Doe" actions in which there is no contact. There
could be created a statutory presumption of no liability in
the no-contact situations, which presumption could be rebutted
only by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the accident
was indeed caused by the no-contact "hit-and-run" driver.
This evidence would usually take the form of statements from
disinterested witnesses referred to above, but perhaps it might
40. The term "insured" includes the named insured and any relative, and
any other person while occupying an insured automobile. Note 13 supra.
41. Professor McCormick states that: "Among the classes of cases to
which this standard of persuasion [clear and convincing proof] has been
applied are .... miscellaneous types of claims and defenses, varying from
state to state, where there is thought to be a special danger of deception
....." C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 320 (1954 ed.).
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also include other evidence such as physical signs at the scene
of the accident. The point is that rather than having the door
of recovery closed automatically and arbitrarily when there
is no physical contact between the unknown car and the in-
sured, the claimant will at least be given a chance to convince
a jury, albeit by the highest degree of persuasion used in
civil litigation, that there was a "John Doe" motorist whose
negligence caused the accident. This does not seem to be
opening the door wide to fraudulent and collusive claims, al-
though it must be conceded that there is a possibility that
such claims will occasionally prevail. This slight crack in
the door would be justified by the recovery allowed to the
bona fide victims of no-contact "hit-and-run" drivers. It
would seem that such a concession would have a much greater
effect in the direction of equity than it would in the direction
of fraud.
V. CONCLUSION
In the ten years since the introduction of uninsured motorist
coverage, it has shown itself to be at least a step in the direc-
tion of alleviating some of the woes of innocent victims of
financially irresponsible motorists. However, it is no panacea,
and often the path to a just reward is lined with pitfalls such
as the physical contact requirement just discussed. While
precautions are necessary in order to prevent fraud and col-
lusion, it would seem highly desirable that the possible al-
ternatives to physical contact be considered by the legislatures.
Until such changes are made in the statutes, it is hoped that
the courts will continue to follow the lead of the California
and New York courts in giving the physical contact require-
ment as liberal an interpretation as is consistent with sound
methods of statutory construction.
WILLIAM L. BETHEA, JR.
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